Legal Translation Versus Legal Interpretation. A Legal-Theoretical Perspective by Zeifert, Mateusz & Tobor, Zygmunt
Title: Legal Translation Versus Legal Interpretation. A Legal-Theoretical 
Perspective
Author: Mateusz Zeifert, Zygmunt Tobor
Citation style: Zeifert Mateusz, Tobor Zygmunt. (2021). Legal Translation Versus 
Legal Interpretation. A Legal-Theoretical Perspective. "International Journal for the 
Semiotics of Law" (2021), doi 10.1007/s11196-021-09837-7
Vol.:(0123456789)
Int J Semiot Law
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-021-09837-7
1 
Legal Translation Versus Legal Interpretation. 
A Legal‑Theoretical Perspective
Mateusz Zeifert1  · Zygmunt Tobor1 
Accepted: 16 March 2021 
© The Author(s) 2021
Abstract
In this article we investigate the relationship between legal translation and legal 
interpretation. The common wisdom is that these activities are closely related, but 
the nature of that relationship remains disputable. We adopt the perspective of 
legal theory—as opposed to the perspective of translation studies—which seems 
to be underrepresented in the literature of the subject. We start with distinguish-
ing between the two notions of legal interpretation: the wide sense (interpretation as 
understanding) and the narrow sense (interpretation as problem solving). We argue 
that the relationship between legal translation and legal interpretation changes sig-
nificantly depending on the notion of legal interpretation that is assumed. The wide 
sense is often assumed by translation scholars and it renders legal interpretation 
as a necessary prerequisite for legal translation. Jurists, on the other hand, usually 
assume the narrow sense which renders legal interpretation and legal translation as 
two distinct activities with some shared features. We then focus on four issues of 
legal interpretation in the narrow sense: the types of legal interpretive problems, the 
creation of legal interpretive problems, the methods of legal interpretation, the reso-
lution of legal interpretive problems. We conclude with a detailed comparison of 
legal translation and legal interpretation in the context of those four issues.
Keywords Legal interpretation · Legal translation · Legal Theory · Legal 
argumentation
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1 Introduction
In this article, we intend to investigate the relationship between translation and inter-
pretation in a legal context. The common wisdom is that legal translation and legal 
interpretation are closely related [26: 262; 16: 376; 2: 109].1 The reasons for this are 
self-evident. They both have a legal text as their object, and the meaning of a legal 
text is the central notion for both of them [2: 109]. The exact nature of their mutual 
relationship is not clear, however. Some authors classify them as two different types 
of "legal-linguistic operations" [20: 270]. Others suggest that they are essentially 
"two sides of the same coin" [16: 375]. Some render legal interpretation as "the 
most important part of legal translation" [11: 5], whereby no translation is possible 
without interpretation [30: 150]. According to a similar view, “legal translation is a 
special case of legal interpretation” [1: 55]. Conversely, others claim that legal inter-
pretation is actually a peculiar kind of translation, namely "intralingual translation" 
[49: 180] or that translation can be viewed as a model for legal interpretation [29: 
1171]. Still, the prevailing view is that translators should refrain from interpreting 
legal texts [2: 109; 5, 46, 53: 64].
These theoretical discrepancies are certainly fuelled by the fact that both trans-
lation and interpretation also have a much broader, non-legal significance. From a 
more general perspective, translation may be conceived as an "interpretive practice" 
[30: 149] or "interpretation of verbal signs by means of some other language” [27: 
145]. The philosopher H.-G. Gadamer famously claimed that "every translation is at 
the same time an interpretation. We can even say that the translation is the culmina-
tion of the interpretation that the translator has made of the words given him" [20: 
386]. Similarly, the prominent semiotician Umberto Eco believed that translation 
is a "limited type of interpretation" [26: 263] or "a special kind of interpretation" 
[12: 130]. By contrast, another radical view, interestingly also attributed to Gad-
amer, holds that essentially "all communication is translation" [44: 187] and seeks 
to expand translation theory "into a comprehensive theory of language" [44: 187].
All these claims, as conflicting as they are, are too vague to be easily rejected and 
too general to have any practical value. In our opinion, much of the inconsistency of 
different views about the relation between legal translation and legal interpretation 
comes from the indeterminacy of the meaning of the term interpretation. Bajčić has 
made a valid point that "interpretation in law is not necessarily the same as interpre-
tation in translation studies [2: 109]. As a matter of fact, the subject matter so far has 
been discussed mainly amongst translation scholars who, even if they have sufficient 
legal training or experience in legal drafting, are not necessarily familiar with the 
theoretical and practical subtleties of legal interpretation. This may, and sometimes 
does, lead to the use of imprecise or confused terms, deficient or outdated classifi-
cations, etc. This should come as no surprise, as specialists from all relevant disci-
plines, including translation scholars, terminologists, linguists and comparative law-
yers, "tend to approach legal translation through a methodological lens and in line 
1 Note that in English the word interpretation means also ’oral translation’.
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with interests prevalent in their disciplines" [6: 2]. Our goal, therefore, is to provide 
a legal-theoretical perspective on the relationship between legal translation and legal 
interpretation.
2  Terminological Clarifications
2.1  The Concept of Legal Translation
It is necessary to begin with some terminological clarifications. The concept of 
legal interpretation is the central topic of this article and will be discussed in detail. 
However, the concept of legal translation that we adopt also demands some clari-
fication. We take a definition by Galdia as a point of departure. According to him, 
legal translation is "the procedure in which legal speech acts of the source language 
are transformed into meaningful and equivalent legal speech acts in the target lan-
guage" [20: 271]. Setting aside the problem of oral interpretation, it may be noted 
that legal speech acts are normally expressed in legal texts. Therefore it is crucial 
to distinguish legal texts from non-legal texts. This is a point of contention between 
various translation theorists. Some emphasise the textual functions of a text, others 
the discursive parameters of a communicative situation [42: 262]. Numerous typolo-
gies of legal texts have been presented, resulting in the inclusion or exclusion of 
certain categories, i.e. private documents used in court proceedings as part of docu-
mentary evidence [see: 8: 7–13; 25: 178–179; 42: 262–265]. Due to such discrepan-
cies, some authors have criticised the distinction between legal and non-legal texts, 
and proposed a distinction between the legal and non-legal function of a translation 
instead [16: 384; 8: 8]. Still, we find most definitions of legal translation to be pro-
totypical rather than criterial, meaning that they do not determine rigid boundaries 
of the activity in question [see: 59: 95–98]. The prototypical, or the most representa-
tive, type of legal texts are normative texts i.e. statutes, codes, constitutions, regula-
tions, international treatises, etc. [42: 262–263; 25: 178–179; 16: 275]. Accordingly, 
this will be our focal point. The discussion below refers primarily to normative texts 
and secondarily to other binding texts, i.e. private contracts, wills, and—to some 
extent—judicial and administrative decisions, as well as notarial documents. Non-
binding texts, such as litigation documents, legal scholarly works, etc. are generally 
outside the scope of our interest, although some findings may apply to them as well.
2.2  The Concept of Legal Interpretation
Having discussed the concept of legal translation, we can now concentrate on the 
crucial concept of legal interpretation. As has already been mentioned, interpre-
tation is a vague and polysemous term, meaning that it has numerous senses that 
are semantically connected but nevertheless different [i.e. see the discussion in 18: 
1237–1243; 56: 13–36]. In legal theory, numerous typologies and classifications 
have been proposed. One such classification comes from the Polish legal philoso-
pher Jerzy Wróblewski [4: 12]. He identified three main senses of interpretation: the 
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widest sense (sensu largissimo), the wide sense (sensu largo) and the narrow sense 
(sensu stricto). Interpretation in the widest sense covers all sorts of understanding of 
cultural objects. Interpretation in the wide sense refers to ascribing meaning to lin-
guistic communication (spoken or written). In other words, to interpret sensu largo 
means simply to understand language. Interpretation in the narrow sense occurs 
only whenever there are doubts about the meaning of a particular act of linguistic 
communication. This complies with the observation by Frederick Schauer that “we 
normally reserve the word»interpretation« for those applications of language that 
present some sort of problem” [quoted in 15: 476]. The latter sense introduces a 
distinction between interpretation as a deliberate, discursive activity on the one hand 
and mere understanding (also called direct understanding) on the other. An interest-
ing parallel with translation may be noted: “[l]ike the interlanguage translation of 
texts, interpretation in law proceeds first by understanding the sense or meaning of 
the text at issue in its original context” [29: 1211]. This view has been advocated 
by many prominent contemporary legal scholars: “[u]nderstanding is an ability, and 
interpretation is an activity” [14: 461], “[i]nterpretation is possible only against a 
background of unreflective linguistic practice. Interpretation is one of a number of 
reflective activities we engage in when conventional meanings are called into ques-
tion” [39: 54]. It has deep philosophical roots that we cannot discuss here [see i.e. 
14].
Legal (or judicial, or juristic, or statutory, or operative) interpretation is often 
construed as interpretation in the narrow sense [4: 8–16]. It conforms to the obser-
vation that legal rules are mostly applied to cases in a quasi-mechanical manner, 
without the need to elaborate on their meaning. These are the so-called "easy" cases. 
Only when doubts arise as to the application of a rule in a particular factual situ-
ation is interpretation called for. These are the so-called "hard" cases that require 
making interpretive decisions [14: 466]. It should be noted that this distinction is of 
a pragmatic—as opposed to semantic—nature, and the same legal rule may require 
interpretation in one case and be merely understood (i.e. without interpretation) in 
another [23: 82].
3  Legal Translation and Interpretation sensu largo
How does the above conceptual distinction alter the answer to our main question 
about the relation between legal translation and legal interpretation? If we adopt the 
wide sense of interpretation (sensu largo), i.e. interpretation as understanding, it 
will mean that interpretation is a prerequisite for legal translation. Such an approach 
is indeed common in literature on the subject: "In a very basic sense we can say that 
legal interpretation is text-based rational activity that seeks to give rational meaning 
to a legal text, or an expression in a legal text [26: 263]; "translation, like any act 
of reading, necessarily involves interpretation" [25: 182]; "[t]he aim of interpreta-
tion is essentially to understand" [12: 130]. The reason for this is that translation 
"is based on an understanding of two texts: a source text which is to be translated 
and a target text which is the result of the actual translation process" [20: 272]. A 
text simply cannot be translated if it has not been previously understood: "the first 
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stage in successful translation is to understand the source text fully, and only then 
can the production of a target text follow" [11: 2]. This approach conforms with 
the common sense idea that translation in general consists in understanding and re-
expressing the meaning of a given communication [27: 64].2
Needless to say, legal texts are notorious for being difficult to comprehend. "[L]
egal language tends to remain complicated and hermetic" [33: 129]. Among the 
many factors that lead to this result are: heavy use of technical vocabulary, heavy 
use of archaic, formal or unusual words, impersonal constructions, overuse of nomi-
nalisations and passive voice, and graphical organisation of text [55: 203–210]. 
These formal features of legal text, though possibly intimidating for a lay person, 
should not scare off any professional translator. However, there are additional lay-
ers of difficulties in understanding legal texts. Ultimately "law is not a discipline of 
words, but of concepts" [2: 7], and concepts – not words – are "crystallisations of 
legal rules" [33: 137]. A translator, in order to understand a legal text, must grasp 
the concepts that are encapsulated in it. To do this, they must understand legal insti-
tutions created with those concepts [20: 278]. And legal institutions are inseparable 
from the legal systems in which they function: “the interconnections within each 
legal system as well as the legal culture in general influence the meaning and prac-
tical impact of legal concepts” [28: 7].3 Consequently, linguistic competence does 
not constitute a sufficient condition of understanding legal texts [54: 15], because 
a "legal text derives its meaning from a particular legal system or systems [46: 5].4 
Hence, "the level of difficulty of a legal translation does not primarily depend on lin-
guistically determined differences, but rather on structural differences between legal 
systems" [20: 274].
Obviously, this state of affairs poses a challenge for translators of legal texts, 
demanding from them an expertise not only in languages, but also in law [22: 259, 
40: 145, 44: 192]. In other words, "translators must step into the realm of law" [26: 
262] and "know how lawyers, including judges and lawmakers, think and write, and 
how they write the way they do" [8: 5]. This aspect of legal translation has been 
duly acknowledged in translation studies. Ramos has proposed a detailed model of 
legal translation competence, focusing on thematic and cultural subcompetences that 
include "knowledge of legal systems, hierarchy of legal sources, branches of law and 
main legal concepts; an awareness of asymmetry between legal notions and struc-
tures in different legal traditions" [41: 12]. Similar efforts, inspired by translation 
hermeneutics, were undertaken by Piecychna, who complains that the importance 
of understanding the source text is underestimated even by professional translators 
[40: 155]. According to her, the legal translation thematic subcompetence should 
comprise of "understanding and knowledge of the differences between various legal 
2 We expect that this assumption may come to be questioned on the grounds of recent technological 
advances (i.e. Google translate and similar devices), but that is not our point of interest (nor of our schol-
arly competence).
3 The feature of being "system-bound" is not unique to law. In fact, it is shared by many other disci-
plines, including religion, political science and philosophy [26: 180].
4 Certainly, translation in general also requires more than mere linguistic competence.
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systems and legal cultures; the ability to compare various foreign legal systems with 
reference to the specificity of the translation task; understanding and knowledge 
of different sub-fields of law, such as civil law, criminal law, family law, interna-
tional law, trade law, etc.; the ability to interpret and analyze a legal text" [40: 154]. 
Some scholars have suggested that cooperation between translators and lawyers can 
guarantee the best results [26: 268], while others have advocated for extended legal 
training for translators [11: 10–12; 41: 18–19]. The general consensus is that legal 
translation is, at heart, an interdisciplinary endeavour [see i.e. 8, 22, 41, 42]. There 
is even some empirical evidence that translators who have a law degree do signifi-
cantly better at translating legal texts than those who lack professional legal educa-
tion [30: 210–211, see also: 40: 147].
To conclude this part of the article: if we adopt a wide sense of interpretation 
(sensu largo), then we have no choice but to agree that all legal translation must 
necessarily be preceded by an act of legal interpretation. This conclusion, as obvious 
as it is, nevertheless places a heavy burden on translators (and translation theory), 
given both the linguistic and extra linguistic characteristics of the legal domain.
4  Legal Translation and Interpretation sensu stricto
Things change if we adopt a different sense of interpretation, namely interpretation 
in the narrow sense (sensu stricto). This concept introduces a distinction between 
understanding and interpretation. As a result, although translators are obviously still 
required to understand legal texts in order to do their job, they do not necessarily 
need to interpret them.
Such a narrow view of legal interpretation is also represented among translation 
scholars. However, opinions on whether translators may or should engage in such 
activity are divided. Cao claims that "[t]he legal translator does not read and inter-
pret the law the way a lawyer does" [8: 5]. Similarly, Šarcevic points out that "it is 
generally accepted that the translator must understand the source text, but not inter-
pret it in the legal sense [46: 5]. The distinction between understanding and interpre-
tation is directly addressed by Piecychna: "But it is not only understanding that plays 
an important role in the translational process. The act of interpretation can also be 
distinguished as having a significant role. Having understood a text, a legal transla-
tor’s task is to interpret the source message and transpose it into the target message" 
[40: 155]. It is important to note, however, that no criteria for this distinction are 
provided.
Such criteria have been offered by some other scholars and it is necessary to 
critically assess them at this point. Chromá suggests that legal interpretation only 
comes into question whenever "the legal context is to be considered when looking 
for an adequate meaning" [11: 7]. Therefore she implies that in some (most?) cases, 
translators of legal texts do not have to consider the legal context in order to find 
the appropriate meaning of a legal text. Such a claim is untenable. As follows from 
the analysis above, legal context is indispensable for understanding legal texts. In 
fact, the significance of legal knowledge is undisputed in legal translation theory, 
and it is rightly included in theoretical models of legal translation competence [16, 
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26, 40, 41]. By contrast, Weyers states that a major difference between lawyers and 
translators (and presumably also between legal interpretation and legal translation) 
is that lawyers tend to take their point of departure in the meaning of words, whereas 
translators rather take larger textual units, such as the sentence or the section, as 
their point of departure [referred to by 16: 376]. We find such a difference to be 
purely methodological, not conceptual. Nevertheless, it is a step in the right direc-
tion, although it describes the effect rather than the cause. The latter is correctly 
identified by Husa, who notes that "a translator deciphers all of the text whereas 
legal interpretation is much more selective. In other words, only difficult or unclear 
parts of legal texts require interpretation, because in most cases the meaning of the 
words and sentences are rather unproblematic; in contrast, interpretation is needed 
only when there is uncertainty or a dispute about which legal meaning one can or 
should attribute to a text" [26: 263]. His findings fit quite well with the legal view 
presented above. Legal interpretation (i.e. interpretation sensu stricto) is selective 
not because lawyers, unlike linguistically educated translators, tend to focus on par-
ticular words, but because only particular words (or phrases, or sentences, etc.) pose 
interpretive doubts and therefore require legal interpretation. As Fallon puts it, "[a]
n important challenge for legal interpretation is to resolve puzzlement, uncertainty, 
or disagreement about claims of legal meaning" [18: 1276]. In other words, legal 
interpretation in the sense discussed is not primarily a matter of communication, but 
rather of problem-solving. This leads us to ask four instructive questions: what are 
these problems?, how they are created?, how can they be solved?, and who can solve 
them?
5  The Four Problems of Legal Interpretation
5.1  The Types of Legal Interpretive Problems
There is no finite list of legal interpretive problems and their typologies vary; none-
theless, there are certainly some recurrent ones that are rather uncontroversial. These 
include: syntactic ambiguity, lexical ambiguity, ambiguity of reference (classifica-
tion) and vagueness [52: 338]. The following examples were selected from various 
legal systems, which is a testimony to the universality of the typology in question:
a. Syntactic ambiguity: The provision grants a tax relief on “expenses incurred for 
(…) the purchase of individual equipment, devices and technical tools necessary 
for rehabilitation and facilitating life activities” [see: 58: 37–38]. Does the adjec-
tive “individual” refer only to “equipment” or to the whole phrase: “equipment, 
devices and technical tools”? In other words, must devices and technical tools 
also be individual in order to be tax-free? The syntax of the provision (i.e. the 
word order in the sentence) is ambiguous as it allows two linguistically plausible 
readings, not unlike Chomsky’s famous example: "Flying planes can be danger-
ous" [10: 41–42].
b. Lexical ambiguity: A contract provides for the delivery of chicken. A dispute 
arose between the buyer and the seller as to the meaning of the word chicken. 
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Does it mean a young chicken, suitable for broiling and frying, or any bird of the 
genus that meets contract specifications on weight and quality? [see: 47: 1–6] 
The word chicken is clearly polysemous in that it has (at least) two related, albeit 
distinct, senses, and consequently the language of contract allows two linguisti-
cally plausible readings.
c. Ambiguity of reference (classification): EU law vests the power to issue European 
Arrest Warrants onto judicial authorities of member states, without providing 
a definition of the term “judicial authority”. As a result, national institutions 
assigned as “judicial authorities” by different member states vary to a great extent: 
from courts and judges to prosecutors’ offices and police boards [see: 59: 100–
113]. There are simply no rigid linguistic criteria for classifying an institution 
as a “judicial authority” according to EU law, and this is how the ambiguity of 
reference occurs.
d. Vagueness: By statute, it is an offence to cause a child to be “neglected, aban-
doned, or exposed, in a manner likely to cause him unnecessary suffering or injury 
to health” [see: 15: 16–17]. Words like neglecting, abandoning, or unnecessary 
suffering are vague in that they do not specify the scope of their application. 
Instead, their application necessarily involves making evaluative judgments, i.e. 
how long does it take to leave a child without supervision to classify it as aban-
doning? or what level of mental discomfort is enough to be classified as suffering? 
Statutes in all languages abound with vague words and phrases, such as reason-
able time, high probability, necessary means, significant amount, etc.
Note, however, that not all possible linguistic indeterminacy amount to legal inter-
pretive doubts. Most issues are resolved by textual or extra-textual context, just as in 
everyday life. For example, nobody will notice the syntactic ambiguity of the sen-
tence "Flying planes can be dangerous" if we utter it as a reaction to news about a 
plane crush. Similarly, a judge will not be bothered by the vagueness of the phrase 
"a significant amount of a psychotropic drug" if it was 4000 kg of amphetamine that 
was smuggled. These observations lead to the next question concerning the way in 
which interpretive problems are created.
5.2  The Creation of Legal Interpretive Problems
The common-sense view that "only difficult or unclear parts of legal texts require 
interpretation" [26: 263] is rather misleading. As the previous examples show, the 
need for legal interpretation is not triggered solely by linguistic features (ambiguity, 
vagueness, etc.) of the legal text, because context may do the job (and usually does). 
What triggers the need for legal interpretation are doubts whether the law, expressed 
in language, applies to a particular situation or—if we adopt the opposite perspec-
tive—"whether a particular event in the world fits a legally relevant category" [52: 
338]. To put it in yet another way: legal interpretation is the "resolution of questions 
about what the content of the law is in its application to particular cases" [50: 321]. 
These questions may arise for different reasons, but usually they happen because of 
discrepancies between a legal rule and the facts of the case: “[m]ost disputes over 
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the meanings of statutes are about the fit between events in the world and the words 
in the statute” [51: 50]. This leads us to acknowledging the role of a factual situa-
tion in legal interpretation. According to the hermeneutic tradition, the meaning of a 
legal text is only found in its application to a particular case [19: 334, 17: 633]. This 
approach has recently been named concurrent interpretation, as opposed to prospec-
tive interpretation [see: 57]. Other scholars draw a distinction between text-oriented 
interpretation or interpretation in abstracto on the one hand, and fact-oriented inter-
pretation or interpretation in concreto on the other [see: 24]. This is actually a very 
compelling subject that exceeds our scope of interest in this article. Suffice it to say 
that as far as operative (i.e. judicial) interpretation is concerned, the factual situation 
is a crucial factor involved in generating interpretive doubts.
5.3  The Methods of Legal Interpretation
Legal interpretation has a specific method of its own, or so it is believed in transla-
tion studies [41: 15, 40: 147]. It is not an easy task to define such a method in a 
detailed manner, however. Undoubtedly, there is no shortage of rules of interpre-
tation, known also as directives, maxims, canons, etc., used by lawyers practicing 
in various legal systems and catalogued by jurists. To a large extent they converge 
amongst legal cultures, at least within Western world [see: 4]. However, they are no 
more really than rules of thumb [52: 338]. In our opinion, they are best thought of as 
heuristic tools that provide framework for interpretive analyses, but in no way dic-
tate the results of interpretation [see: 35].
In a classic paper, Karl Llewellyn argued that guidance by canons of interpre-
tation is mere illusion and that in fact "there are two opposing canons on almost 
every point" [31: 401]. In addition to that, there is a deep theoretical disagreement 
about the ultimate goal of legal interpretation, particularly vivid in American legal 
thinking. For the intentionalists it is the reconstruction of the meaning intended by 
the legislator. For the textualists it is the reconstruction of the objective meaning of 
the legal text [see i.e. 32, 52]. The answer to this theoretical dilemma dictates the 
references that one is willing to consider during the process of interpretation. Apart 
from the most obvious one, namely the legal text in question, lawyers and judges 
consult various other evidence in their search for meaning. This may include other 
legal texts (including international treatises and supranational law), law books, law 
journals, previous judicial decisions, dictionaries and legislative history, as well as 
philosophical treatises, the Holy Scripture, popular literature, newspapers, polls, sci-
entific reports and linguistic corpora.
5.4  The Resolution of Legal Interpretive Problems
Legal interpretation in the narrow sense is conducted mostly by legal profession-
als: lawyers, judges, etc. However, here an important distinction is in place. Legal 
interpretation may either be authoritative (i.e. legally binding) or not. This does not 
depend on methodological or other aspects of the interpretation itself, but purely 
on the institutional position of the interpreter. As Harvey notes, in law, not unlike 
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in religious systems, "disputes over interpretation are settled by an official body (in 
this case, a court) which imposes a legally binding construction of a text" [25: 181]. 
Some legal scholars have even built the element of authoritativeness into their defi-
nitions of legal interpretation [see: 50: 1].
This element has such significance because of the effects it bears. An interpreta-
tive decision by a judge (or other public official) undertaken in a particular case is 
legally binding, meaning that it determines the rights and obligations of the par-
ties involved. An interpretation of the same provision, identical in terms of method 
and result, undertaken by a lawyer (or a legal scholar, a politician, a journalist, etc.) 
bears no legal force. Another salient trait of legal interpretation (both authoritative 
and non-authoritative) is its persuasive character. Legal interpretation is rarely, if 
ever, conducted for purely cognitive purposes. It is embedded in a practical legal 
discourse and aimed at advancing a particular construction of the text in question, be 
it a constitution, a statute, an international agreement, a contract or a will. As put by 
Fallon, "standards for the determination of legal meaning are necessarily internal to 
legal practice" [18: 1243]. Even at conceptual level, legal interpretation is inherently 
tied to legal argumentation; it is indeed an "argumentative battle concerning mean-
ing" [16: 385]. Using more philosophical categories we can say that legal interpre-
tation requires adopting an internal point of view in the Hartian sense, namely a 
practical attitude of acceptance of a given legal system [see: 48]. A similar idea has 
already been expressed in legal translation studies [27: 264].
6  Legal Translation and Legal Interpretation sensu stricto: A Detailed 
Comparison
The above answers to the four questions regarding legal interpretative problems are 
by no means exhaustive. Their role is merely to serve as reference points for fur-
ther discussion. Having formulated them, we can now compare legal translation and 
legal interpretation in more specific measures.
To begin with, translation affects whole texts or their parts, independent of the 
doubts or lack thereof. This is why, from a translator’s perspective, legal interpreta-
tion seems "selective" [26: 263]. Of course, legal translators in their work are con-
fronted with manifold difficulties [see: 22, 25, 40, 41], some of which may converge 
to the interpretive problems as identified in legal theory: ambiguity, vagueness, etc. 
It is very doubtful, however, that they have the legitimacy to eliminate them. Inde-
terminacy in legal texts is often deliberate [see 15]. In this respect, the legal text is 
comparable to a literary text, in which indeterminacy "is viewed not a defect but as 
an inherent feature which should be retained in translation" [25: 181]. Therefore, 
translators should not run the risk of upsetting the delicately achieved balance of a 
legal instrument by “attempting to clarify vague points, obscurities, and ambigui-
ties” [46: 8]. If a translator eliminates ambiguity by choosing one possible meaning 
over another, they put themselves into the legislator’s shoes (from the perspective 
of a judge) or in the judge’s shoes (from the perspective of a legislator); neither 
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role is designed for them5: “[i]n regard to ambiguities, it is generally agreed that the 
translator has no authority to resolve an ambiguity in the source text as this could 
be an act of interpretation” [45: 92]. The same goes for vagueness. Most obviously, 
a translator is not supposed to eliminate vagueness by using a more precise term, 
because by doing so she would modify the normative content of the text [see: 34: 
93–99].
As a matter of fact, not all indeterminacy in legal text is deliberate. Most nota-
bly, ambiguity (both syntactic and lexical) is usually testimony to the legislator’s 
incompetence [50: 18–19]. Still, the translator generally does not enjoy the legiti-
macy to correct such drafting errors, although the situation depends significantly on 
the institutional context and the type of legal text in question. Therefore we gener-
ally agree that “the translator must avoid value judgments (to the extent possible)" 
and that "the translator’s task is to convey what»is said« in the source text and not 
what he/she believes it»ought to say«" [46: 5]. The problem here is that the indeter-
minacy of a legal text, except for the most obvious instances of syntactic ambiguity, 
is seldom identifiable outside of the context of a particular factual situation. We are 
sympathetic to Engberg’s claim that a translator “must at all times discover what 
specific words and terms mean in the concrete situation” [16: 385]. However, there 
are several reasons why translators are usually deprived of such context. The skopos 
or purpose of a particular translation, i.e. defined in a translation brief, provides only 
some very general context. Consequently, translators may be unaware of the inde-
terminacy in the text they are working on, and may eliminate it unknowingly. As 
Harvey states, "indeed, it requires interpretation to identify ambiguity, decide it is 
deliberate, and choose to retain it in the translation" [25: 181].
In this context, it is worth mentioning the idea of translation universals. There 
appear to be certain general and universal tendencies that typically characterise 
translations rather than original texts, which are irrelevant of the language pairs 
involved or the type of the text, and which result rather from the inherent features 
of the translation process [7, 43]. These, according to Baker, include: explicitation 
(a tendency to spell things out rather than leave them implicit), simplification (a ten-
dency to make the text more intelligible and resolve ambiguities), normalisation (a 
tendency to use typical expressions in lieu of atypical ones) and sanitation (a ten-
dency to correct errors) [3; 7: 18–19]. The topic of translation universals is an inter-
esting and controversial one, though we have neither the competence nor intention 
to elaborate on it here [see i.e. 9, 43]. However, it does seem that these features may 
be relevant for legal translation. The tendencies to correct supposed errors, eliminate 
ambiguities or make things explicit are likely to impact not only the intelligibility of 
the target text, but also its normative content. Still, the role of a translator is to trans-
late the text, not to improve it [45: 92].
Many translation scholars insist that legal translators should be trained to inter-
pret legal texts [25: 182, 40: 147, 41: 13]. However, as has already been noted, there 
5 A special case would be the institution of "co-drafting" known in bilingual and multilingual jurisdic-
tions, such as Canada, Switzerland, or the European Union, which incorporates translators into the pro-
cess of legislative drafting and thus officially puts them in legislator’s shoes [see: 46: 5].
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is no single method of legal interpretation. The so-called "rules of interpretation" 
[41: 13] are merely heuristic tools that lose their value if isolated from the broader 
context of legal reasoning and argumentation. As mentioned, legal interpretation is 
an inherent part of legal practical discourse. This is well illustrated by the mate-
rials lawyers refer to in their interpretation. As Husa notes, "for legal interpreta-
tion, sometimes the key-elements for the interpretation come from outside of the 
text itself" [26: 264]. Many of them are legal-specific, i.e. previous judicial deci-
sions (case law), other legal acts (known as "systemic interpretation") or legal values 
(known as "teleological" or "purposive" interpretation). To utilise such sources of 
reference in one’s interpretation, it requires a profound knowledge of not only the 
legal text in question, but of the legal system as a whole.
Such knowledge is assumed in certain models of legal translation competence 
[see: 41: 13], and rightly so. The difficulty lies not in its level of sophistication or 
complexity, but rather in the highly practical nature of the knowledge. It can hardly 
be attained without participating in legal discourse. In other words, it requires an 
internal perspective, naturally adopted by a practising lawyer or a judge. A transla-
tor’s perspective, on the other hand, is by default external. In Hart’s terms, an exter-
nal point of view refers to a person who is an observer "whose interest in the law 
is primarily theoretical, who simply wishes to describe how members of a group 
regard and respond to a set of rules and, perhaps, who wishes to make predictions 
as well" [48: 1159–1160]. This explanation conforms to the claims of translation 
theory, where the difference between legal interpretation and legal translation is ren-
dered as a difference between two epistemic points of view [26: 264] and the trans-
lator is described as "an outsider not involved in the official and binding process of 
interpretation […] an outsider to the discourse community" [16: 386].
The above statements should not conceal the actual impact of a translator’s work 
on the meaning of legal texts. The end product of a translator’s work is usually 
the starting point for an interpretive enquiry. Thus, it is obvious that a translator’s 
choices may directly affect the outcome of legal interpretation [see examples in 1: 
45–55]. For instance, “by favouring a certain type of equivalent, the translator effec-
tively sends a signal to the courts as to how that term should be interpreted” [46: 7]. 
Terminological choices, of course, are not the only aspect of translated texts that 
may affect their future interpretation. Formal properties, such as the syntax of a pro-
vision, are also relevant [45: 162]. In fact, poor translation may cause interpretive 
doubts that would never have occurred in the original language [5: 11].
This state of affairs has been noted in translation theory. The traditional notion 
of a translator as a mere mediator between the source text producer(s) and the target 
text receiver(s) is being questioned. In line with the current trends in general transla-
tion theory, many scholars paint the picture of a legal translator as an independent 
“text producer” rather than a “bilingual typist” providing simple linguistic equiva-
lence [16: 382, 25: 180, 45: 97, 46: 4]. Indeed, in some legal systems translators are 
thought to be “co-drafting laws rather than translating them” [21: 75]. In Canada, 
this approach is called “bijuralism” [13: 34–35], while in the European Union it is 
often referred to as “multilingual drafting” [53: 59–60]. Still, such a new conceptu-
alisation of the translator’s role not only fails to eliminate practical problems inher-
ent in the translation process, but in fact it creates some more [53: 63–64]. It seems 
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that we face a paradox: lawyers and judges, due to their embedment in practical legal 
discourse, have the tools to identify interpretive doubts, but do not have the power 
to eliminate them from legal texts. At the same time, the external epistemic position 
of translators means they generally lack the tools to identify interpretive doubts, but 
they do have the power (though not necessarily the legitimacy) to eliminate them 
from legal texts (namely target texts).
Finally, it is important to discuss the goal of legal translation versus the goal of 
legal interpretation. The former has been defined in many different ways. For Gal-
dia, it is establishing “a relationship of equivalence between the source and the tar-
get texts” [20: 272]. For Pelage, it is creating the target text with “the same meaning 
potential as the original texts” [quoted by Engberg in 17: 376]. For Šarcevic it is pro-
ducing “parallel texts that will be interpreted and applied uniformly by the courts” 
[46: 5]. Similarly, for Engberg, it is creating a text “that is interpreted in the same 
way by readers familiar with the target-language legal system as the source-language 
text is interpreted by readers familiar with the source-language legal system” [16: 
375–376]. Chromá is even more specific, claiming that “the primary objective of 
legal translation is that the target recipient should be provided with as explicit, 
extensive and precise legal information in the target language as is contained in the 
source text, complemented (by the translator) with facts rendering the original infor-
mation fully comprehensible in the different legal environment and culture” [11: 6].
The latter is often defined as finding or establishing the correct meaning of a legal 
text. However, given the concept of interpretation sensu stricto that has been used 
in this article, this equates with finding the correct answer to a particular interpre-
tive doubt. In either case, there is a noticeable lack of agreement amongst jurists 
and legal theorists as to what counts as correct. This is clearly a consequence of 
the lack of any uniform concept of meaning that would be commonly accepted in 
legal discourse. For instance, Fallon distinguishes the following notions referred to 
by legal practitioners and scholars: “(1) semantic or literal meaning; (2) contextual 
meaning as framed by shared presuppositions of speakers and listeners, including 
shared presuppositions about application and non-application; (3) real conceptual 
meaning; (4) intended meaning; (5) reasonable meaning; and (6) interpreted mean-
ing” [18: 1244–1245]. These “types of meaning” somewhat correspond to the meth-
ods of translation as listed by Newmark [36: 45–47], which include: word-for-word 
translation, literal translation, faithful translation, semantic translation, adaptation, 
free translation, idiomatic translation and communicative translation.
Although this paper is not the place to discuss the tangled issue raised above, 
it may be instructive to note one important similarity between legal interpretation 
and legal translation that pertains to this topic. It is their shared reliance on the con-
cept of the author’s intent. As Harvey observed, "the notion of authorial intent, long 
derided as the “intentional fallacy” by literary critics, is alive and well in both trans-
lation studies and legal studies" [25: 181]. Engberg claims that the task of both legal 
interpreter (i.e. a judge) and legal translator is to establish the meaning most prob-
ably intended by the utterer (i.e. text’s author), although their perspectives and meth-
odologies vary [16: 381, 387]. An important insight is made by Šarcevic. According 
to her, "the translator’s task is to produce a text that preserves the unity of the sin-
gle instrument, i.e. its meaning, legal effect, and intent" [46: 5]. She acknowledges, 
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however, that these concepts are not identical, "[w]hereas the presumption of equal 
meaning is subordinate to that of equal effect, both are subordinate to the pre-
sumption of equal intent. Hence, the translator should strive to produce a text that 
expresses the intended meaning and achieves the intended legal effects in practice. 
In jurisprudence this usually implies the legislative intent (legislation), the intent 
of the States parties (treaties, conventions), or the will of the contracting parties 
(contracts)" [46: 5]. In translation studies, this idea is frequently discussed under the 
term fidelity [see i.e. 25: 180–181]. Interestingly, this term, along with its translation 
connotations, has also been imported to legal theory [see: 29].
At the same time, translation theory states that it is not impossible to conceive 
of more than one correct translation of a given text. As put—perhaps a little too 
harshly – by Kischel, “the question in legal translation is not which translation is 
right, but, more modestly, which one is less wrong.”[28: 7]. This is because “[c]
orrectness must be determined by the extent to which the average reader for which a 
translation is intended will be likely to understand it correctly” [37: 1]. This is par-
ticularly noticeable in light of the Skopos theory, which places the communicative 
purpose of the text at the centre of the translator’s enterprise [38: 569–570]. Differ-
ent receivers, or even the same receiver in different communicative situations, will 
assign different functions to the same linguistic material, thus altering its commu-
nicative purpose. This is not the case with legal interpretation. The belief that there 
is one right answer to any interpretive doubt (the Dworkinian “one-right-answer” 
thesis) is rooted deeply in the very idea of the legal system. The communicative pur-
pose of a legal text is always the same—to determine somebody’s rights and obliga-
tions in a binding way. As a result, there is no room for alternative correct interpre-
tations. This is not to say that there may not be competing interpretations. Quite the 
contrary: lawyers are constantly engaged in legal discourse, presenting claims and 
making arguments for their preferred interpretations. However, the whole endeavour 
rests on a presumption that at the end of the day, only one, correct interpretation will 
prevail.
In general, we recognise the concept of fidelity (or authorial intent) as an impor-
tant point of contact between translation theory and legal theory that has the poten-
tial for mutual enrichment, and so is worth exploring in future research. There are 
also numerous other topics that require further investigation, such as the value of 
impartiality in the translator’s and the judge’s work, the problem of the addressees 
of legal translation and legal interpretation, the methodological tools of legal trans-
lation and legal interpretation, and the role of “precedents” in legal translation and 
legal interpretation.
7  Conclusions
To sum up, we would like to underline several crucial points of our discussion. 
There are different concepts of legal interpretation, where the relation between legal 
translation and legal interpretation depends on which of these concepts is chosen. If 
we adhere to the wide concept of legal interpretation (sensu largo), i.e. interpreta-
tion as understanding, we must conclude that every act of translation (by a human 
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being) by definition requires interpretation. If we adhere to the narrow concept of 
legal interpretation (sensu stricto), i.e. interpretation as the resolution of interpretive 
doubts, then we have to acknowledge the differences between the two enterprises. 
Most notably, legal interpretation in the narrow sense is an act of resolving interpre-
tive problems that may or may not arise in the context of particular, factual situa-
tions. It requires identifying the problem, applying an appropriate method of solving 
it, and arriving at the correct solution. Here, numerous similarities and dissimilari-
ties between legal interpretation and legal translation can be observed. This paper 
briefly touches on some of them. There is certainly a need for more in-depth analy-
ses. These ideally should bring together legal and translation perspectives, so that 
both disciplines would benefit from them. We hope that this paper provides some 
useful guidelines for this further research by virtue of presenting a legal theoretical 
perspective on the subject matter, which so far has mostly been discussed by transla-
tion scholars.
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